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Abstract. Role-based access control (RBAC) policies represent the rights 
of subjects in terms of roles to access resources. This research proposes a 
scalable, flexible and auditable RBAC system using the EOS blockchain 
platform to meet the security requirements of organizations. The EOS 
blockchain platform for developing smart contract and decentralized ap- 
plications (DAPPs) aims to address the scalability problem found in 
existing blockchain platforms such as Ethereum and Bitcoin. This smart 
contract platform aims to eliminate transaction fees while conducting 
millions of transactions per second. In our proposed approach, the EOS 
blockchain transparently stores RBAC policies. Administrative roles con- 
trol access to resources at a higher level according to the way organiza- 
tions perform business. An organization creates roles, role hierarchies  and 
constraints to regulate users’ actions. Therefore, once an RBAC framework 
is established, the administrative user (issuer) only needs to grant and 
revoke roles to support changes in the organizational struc-  ture. Moreover, 
resource owners delegate access rights to other subjects (in the same or 
different organization). Our proposed blockchain-based RBAC supports 
delegation capabilities using gaseless transactions which makes it 
adoptable and appealing in a large number of application sce- narios. Our 
proposed solution is application-agnostic and well-suited for diverse use 
cases. Existing state-of-the art security frameworks are not suitable due to 
the difficulty of scale, higher cost and single point of fail- ure. 
Consequently, organizations demand a scalable, cost-effective and 
lightweight access control solution which can better protect their pri-  vacy 
as well. A proof of concept implementation is developed based on the EOS 
blockchain. In particular, we deploy our proposed RBAC smart contract on 
the EOS Kylin testnet. Our experimental results and analysis clearly show 
that our EOS blockchain-based RBAC outperforms exist- ing blockchain 
platforms in terms of cost, latency, block generation time, contract 
execution time and throughput. 
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1 Introduction 
From a functional viewpoint, the Role-based access control (RBAC) concept  
is that operations showing actions are associated with roles and subjects are 
  
 
granted suitable roles according to the organization’s requirements. A role can be 
simply defined as the responsibilities assigned to a subject working in an 
organization. RBAC uses a many-to-many relationships between the subjects, roles 
and operations [1]. Many to many relationship means that a subject can be assigned 
many roles, and a single role can have several subjects. Similarly, a role can be 
assigned many permissions and the same permission can be assigned to many roles. 
The operations that are associated with roles constrain members of  the role to a 
specified set of actions. RBAC supports a wide range of operations depending on 
the type of system such as read, write, insert, delete, update and     so on. RBAC 
policies can be enforced when a subject attempts to execute an operation on an 
object, at the time when subjects are authorized as members       of a role and during 
role activation (e.g., when a role is established as part of a user’ active session). 
The modern concept of RBAC consists of roles, role hierarchies and con- 
straints on subject-role relationship and role-permission relationship. The role 
hierarchy defines an inheritance relationship among roles, that is, that one (ju- 
nior) role may implicitly include the operations, constraints, and objects that are 
associated with another (senior) role. Role hierarchies simplify security adminis- 
tration and maintenance because junior roles implicitly include the permissions 
associated with senior roles [2]. RBAC supports constraints on almost all parts 
including permissions, roles and assignment relations to provide greater flexi- 
bility [1] [3] . The administrative user (issuer) can put a variety of constraints 
including cardinality constraints and mutual exclusivity roles. Cardinality con- 
straint refers to limiting the number of roles that an individual user can belong. 
Moreover, RBAC supports constraints on the authorization of an operation to a 
role and context constraints such as location and time on operations being per- 
formed on objects. Authorization constraints are an important aspect of access 
control and are powerful mechanism for laying out higher-level organizational 
policy. The separation of duties (SoD) is a well-known authorization constraint 
that reduces the risk of frauds by not allowing a single individual to have com- 
plete authority within the system. SoD is implemented in terms of mutual ex- 
clusion of roles. RBAC enforces SoD constraints on subject-role relationship and 
role-permission relationship [4]. In particular, static SoD imposes restrictions on 
the assignment of subjects to roles. For instance, a subject assigned to the doctor 
role may not be granted the nurse role. In general, the constraint (role1, role2, 2) 
states that a subject may be granted one out of the two roles as specified in the 
constraint. Dynamic SoD constraints are enforced at run-time and are outside 
the scope of this article. 
Role management in RBAC can be simply divided into solving the problem 
of assigning subjects to roles, assigning permissions to roles, and assigning roles 
to roles to create a role hierarchy, i.e., an inheritance relationship among roles. 
Moreover, a role hierarchy creates a constraint, e.g., junior child roles obtain the 
permissions associated with senior parent roles. Consequently, a subject as- 
signed to a parent role automatically obtains the permissions associated with all 
the child roles. The role engineering process is the first stage of role man- 
  
 
agement in RBAC, which can be used to create role hierarchy from an existing 
infrastructure. Till now, subject-role assignment, role-permission assignment and 
role-role relation are all implemented using list style. However, the current imple- 
mentations of RBAC require two significant challenges: (a) Constraint Problem: 
constraints such as mutually exclusive roles, i.e., a subject can be assigned to at 
most one role set to achieve the separation of duty constraint. (b) Redundancy 
Problem: Two types of redundancy can occur in the subject-role assignment. 
First, a subject should not be simultaneously assigned a parent role and child 
roles because the parent role already contains the permissions associated with 
the child roles. Second, repetitive permissions should not be assigned to the same 
user. This can happen when the same user is assigned multiple roles which con- 
tains the same permissions. It can be simply solved by revoking that user from 
one of the redundant roles. Finally, the directed acyclic graph (DAG) used to 
represent role hierarchy can be visualized to display the structure of RBAC and 
the assignments. Indeed, such visualization can be exploited to detect mutually 
exclusiveness and redundancy [5]. 
Role-based security provides various advantages such as substantially reduc- 
ing the management cost of access control [5]. RBAC provides lightweight se- 
curity in the sense that it requires less resource consumption in the blockchain 
compared to the existing access control systems [6] Moreover, flexibility and 
expressiveness are the top requirements for an access control system. RBAC is 
a flexible access control solution because it regulates access to resources based 
on the subjects’ activities and job functions within an organization. Moreover, 
RBAC supports the reassignment of a subject from one role to another and the 
assignment of new permissions to roles. Broadly speaking, multiple subjects can 
use the same role to access resources and a single subject can exercise different 
roles on diverse occasions. Another advantage of RBAC is that an administra- 
tive user controls access to resources at a higher level according to the way 
organizations perform business. An organization creates roles, role hierarchies 
and constraints to regulate users’ actions. Therefore, once an RBAC framework 
is established, the administrative user only needs to grant and revoke roles to 
support changes in the organizational structure. Indeed, this offers ease of ad- 
ministration and a more intuitive process of managing access control compared 
to the conventional lower level access control mechanism such as access control 
list (ACL), etc [1]. RBAC can be used to control access to both logical or phys- 
ical objects1. For instance, files, tables and directories are common examples 
of logical resources that hold critical information. An object can also indicate 
critical physical system resources such as computational system, printers, disk 
storage and so on. 
Enterprises can adopt the RBAC system to enhance their security require- 
ments. Enterprises can deploy RBAC system to achieve its major benefits as 
discussed earlier. Consequently, our proposed scalable blockchain-based RBAC 
is motivated to solve the problem of access control in organizations that do not 
 
1 objects or resources can be contents, services, applications, or computing power. In 
this paper, we use both terms interchangeably. 
  
 
wish to rely on a third-party service to manage the trust relationship. However, 
delegation, monitoring of trust relationship and a decentralized design without 
relying on a third party represent the major challenges to achieve this goal. Un- 
fortunately, existing solutions do not address these challenges well. Access con- 
trol list (ACL) provides a simple mechanism to meet the security requirements of 
small organizations containing small number of subjects. However, large organi- 
zations demand a flexible, scalable, decentralized and fine-grained access control 
mechanism because such an environment contains a large number of subjects 
and objects [7]. ACLs typically associate an object with a list of subjects and 
groups. A subject performs an operation on an object if that subject or a group 
to which that subject belongs is specified in the ACL associated with the object. 
ACL is appropriate for implementing security at a lower level, while RBAC uses a 
higher level of abstraction (roles), which better serves the needs of organizations. 
Moreover, RBAC provides more features than ACL such as constraints and role 
hierarchy. An implementation of the RBAC system requires approximately the 
same amount of processing as that required by an ACL implementation [8]. 
A systematic literature review on blockchain in [9] has shown that latency 
and throughput are amongst the major challenges that are not addressed widely 
in earlier blockchain platforms. Also, future blockchain solutions will contain mil- 
lions of people. Transaction latency is an essential characteristic for a blockchain 
platform. It can be simply defined as the total time taken in executing a transac- 
tion and performing its validation. The EOS blockchain requires 0.5 seconds to 
create new blocks in the network which is comparatively very less than the exist- 
ing blockchain platforms. Indeed, a large number of people and organizations are 
now attracted to the EOS blockchain due to its scalability to support millions of 
people [10]. Transaction fee is also a major concern for blockchain platforms. Ex- 
isting smart contract platform such as Ethereum [11] is currently facing a major 
problem in terms of transaction fees. Any transaction in the Ethereum blockchain 
requires users to pay transaction fee to promote the mining node for invoking 
the transaction and for adding it to the chain. However, the EOS blockchain has 
eliminated this problem, thus, enabling users to make gasless transactions 
without incurring any cost [12]. Parallel performance is also inevitable for a 
blockchain platform because it processes transactions per seconds. Unlike ear- 
lier blockchain platforms [11], the EOS blockchain supports parallel execution of 
transactions. The EOS blockchain achieves the above performance advantages 
mainly due to its consensus algorithm. It utilizes the Delegated Proof-of-Stake 
(DPOS) [13] consensus algorithm which is improved compared to the consensus 
techniques of the earlier blockchain platforms such as the Proof-of-Work (PoW) 
[14] consensus algorithm. 
We argue that adopting blockchain for access control solutions is not straight- 
forward and involves several significant challenges such as (i) long latency to con- 
firm transactions (ii) low scalability of the existing blockchain platforms such as 
Bitcoin [15] and Ethereum [11], which is mainly due to broadcasting transactions 
to the blockchain network and (iii) high resource consumption to solve the PoW 
cryptographic puzzle. Consequently, we propose to use the EOS blockchain to 
  
 
solve these significant issues. The EOS is the latest blockchain platform which is 
designed for both private and public use cases. An interesting feature of EOS is 
that it can be used for business needs across organizations. Moreover, the EOS 
project was launched to offer an operating system-like environment to enable a 
quick scaling of decentralized application (i.e., DAPP2). Indeed, this platform is 
intended to overcome the limitations of the existing blockchain platforms. To 
this end, the EOS architecture has considered various novel techniques to pro- 
vide higher throughput and processing abilities [16]. It is worth noticing that the 
EOS blockchain provides a platform that is particularly optimized for smart 
contracts. The ability of this blockchain to provide transactional throughput in 
the millions has attracted the attention from both academia and industry. 
This paper’s contribution is the development of an EOS DAPP to trans- 
late Role-based access control policies to smart contract deployed on the EOS 
blockchain. Our proposed RBAC smart contract accepts different transactions 
such as role assignment, role revocation, role update, permission assignment, 
permission update and permission revocation from the issuer as well as policy 
evaluation transaction from the service/data provider or third parties to vali- date 
RBAC policies in the blockchain. Our proposed smart contract is deployed and 
tested on the EOS Kylin tesnet. Our proposed blockchain-based RBAC provides 
a scalable, decentralized and simple management of roles and permis- sions. Our 
system provides the advantages of both trust-management and RBAC system to 
meet the needs of various organizations. Our proposed approach ex- ploits 
blockchain identities to identify all entities involved in a trust-sensitive 
operations and to validate delegation certificates. The issuer grants roles to the 
EOS public keys representing the registered subjects in an organization. We pro- 
vide qualitative arguments to demonstrate that our proposed blockchain-based 
RBAC achieves privacy, auditability, availability, integrity and confidentiality 
and also discuss how our proposed solution thwarts security attacks such as 
Denial of Service (DOS) attack [17] and impersonation attack. Experimental 
results and analysis clearly reveal that our EOS blockchain-based RBAC out- 
performs earlier blockchain platforms such as Bitcoin [15] and Ethereum [11] in 
terms of cost, latency, throughput, contract execution time and block generation 
time. Consequently, the EOS blockchain is a promising platform to design scal- 
able and efficient access control systems for several environments. Finally, our 
blockchain-based RBAC is not limited to organizations since it can equally be 
used by resource owners to control access to their valuable and critical resources. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is dedicated to the 
Background and Related Work. Section 3 discusses the Role-based access control 
system. Section 4 presents our proposed Blockchain-based RBAC system. Section 
5 discusses the advantages of our proposed approach. Section 6 evaluates the 
performance of the proposed system. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and 
highlights further challenges in this area. 
 
2 (DAPP) is a program that allows users to interact with smart contracts running on 
the blockchain, and store persistent data on the blockchain. 
  
 
2 Background and Related Work 
 
2.1 Access Control System 
An access control system (ACS) can be simply defined as a system that pro- 
tects the critical resources by checking the access requests sent by subjects. An 
ACS can be designed by considering an access control model. It decides whether 
the requesting subject has the right to perform the requested operation on a 
requested object. To this end, the ACS validates the conditions defined in the 
subject’s access control policy. If the policy conditions match with the credentials 
of the subject, then the subject becomes authorized to perform the requested 
operation on the requested object. Otherwise, the request is rejected. 
An access control system should meet the security requirements of privacy 
(hiding the personal information of subjects), integrity (preventing the modifi- 
cation of objects), confidentiality (preventing unauthorized access to data) and 
availability (resources are always available to legitimate subjects) [18]. A com- 
plete access control system requires the following main functions: 
– Authentication: Authentication identifies a legitimate or registered subject. 
Different information can be used to accomplish authentication such as the 
subject’s password, private key of the subject, smart card, etc [18]. 
– Authorization: Authorization is the principal process of an access control 
system that grants or denies permission to an authenticated subject based on 
the information in the access control policy. It includes essential steps such 
as selecting an appropriate access control model, defining the mech- anism 
to store access control policies and implementing the access control 
mechanism to enforce the functionalities defined in the access control model. 
This research primarily focuses on the authorization process by considering 
and implementing the RBAC system to achieve an auditable and scalable 
solution exploiting the EOS blockchain platform. 
– Accountability: The system should be able to produce logs or traces of the 
users’ actions for auditability purposes. This functionality requires technical 
solution for log management. Blockchain is a disruptive technology that pos- 
sesses the potential for tracking users’ actions. Hence, making it a perfect 
candidate for creating an auditable and scalable RBAC system. 
 
Access control system can be classified into four types (i) Discretionary Ac- 
cess Control (DAC) (ii) Mandatory Access Control (MAC) (iii) the famous Role- 
based access control (RBAC) [19] and (iv) the Attribute-based access control 
(ABAC) [20]. Discretionary access control restricts access to resources based on 
the identities of users. Discretionary access control can be characterised from its 
main feature: leaving access permission as a choice of the resource owner who 
controls which subject can perform an operation on a certain resource. Oper- 
ating systems such as Windows and UNIX largely rely on discretionary access 
control to restrict access to resources. The Access Control List (ACL) provides 
a simple mechanism to implement these policies in operating systems. That is, 
DAC associates each resource with a list of subjects who are allowed to access 
  
 
that resource. A subject can perform an operation on a given resource if that 
subject is present in the access control list. These policies can be flexible, but 
weak in security. Moreover, DAC cannot control information efficiently because 
owners can optionally delegate their authorities to other subjects. 
Mandatory access control attaches security labels and clearances to subjects and 
objects to enforce access control decisions. Different security labels are asso- ciated 
with different privileges. A subject can access a given resource if the sub- ject’s 
clearance is equal to or greater than the object’s label. Unlike discretionary access 
control which allows resource owners to enforce policies, mandatory access control 
policies are enforced by a higher authority. It creates an access control relationship 
that the resource owner cannot change. In other words, the admin- istrative user 
enforces mandatory access control policies for all subjects involved in the 
environment. Finally, discretionary access control supports tranquillity in  the sense 
that security labels on subjects and objects do not change (except by  the 
administrative user). Military and sensitive applications commonly exploit 
mandatory access control policies to control access to valuable resources. Manda- 
tory access control policies are usually focused on preserving the confidentiality  of 
data. However, these policies are expensive and difficult to implement. 
On the contrary, Role-based access control exploits multiple roles to sep- 
arate the responsibilities of subjects. RBAC manages the access control rela- 
tionship between subjects and objects independently. Consequently, it assigns 
access rights to roles representing job responsibilities, not directly to subjects 
[21] [18]. Finally, Attribute-based access control is a logical access control system 
which considers the attributes of subjects, objects and various environmental at- 
tributes to control access to resources. ABAC controls access decisions simply 
by changing attributes values, without the need to change the subject/object 
relationships. ABAC differs from RBAC in the sense that resource owners or 
administrative users apply access control policies without prior knowledge of the 
subjects. ABAC is also flexible because the administrative users do not need to 
modify objects and rules. When a new subject joins an organization, the admin- 
istrative user simply assigns the attributes necessary for access control decisions. 
However, ABAC is not appropriate for sharing information among multiple or- 
ganizations due to its increased complexity that requires an array of functions 
and an attribute management infrastructure [20]. 
 
2.2 Access Control Requirements 
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) is one of the most popular and widely de- 
ployed access control system. In both intra-organizational and inter-organizational 
workflows, RBAC provides the basis of access control. RBAC provides various 
well-recognized advantages over other access control systems such as Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC). Among these, 
flexibility and ease of management are the greatest virtues of RBAC. The au- 
thors in [22] have identified a few access control requirements for organizations. 
This article further investigates the requirements as follows: The access control 
service should meet the following requirements: 
  
 
– Least Privilege: Many organizations require that subjects should only acquire 
the permissions needed to perform their job functions. In other words, this 
principle requires that a subject should not be given no more privileges than 
necessary to perform his job functions. To ensure least privilege, a 
subject’s job functions first need to be identified. Then we determine the 
minimum set of privileges that are needed to perform that function. Non- 
RBAC systems can solve this problem, but in a costly and difficult way. For 
instance, consider the case of a capability-based system where a subject 
assigned to a job function may obtain more privileges than required. This is 
due to the fact that the capability-based system does not consider attributes 
or constraints to enforce access control decisions. However, RBAC allows a 
subject to perform only those operations that are needed once that subject is 
assigned an appropriate role. Therefore, RBAC assigns role for a particular 
object based on the least privilege principle [1] [23]. 
– Delegation of Authority: Employees in an organization should be able to 
transfer access rights to other employees for some reasons. For instance, a 
subject designated as a leader of a group of peers in an organization may del- 
egate tasks to peers in that group. To accomplish this goal, RBAC supports  the 
delegation of authority principle [24]. With this property, a subject (del- egator) 
transfers the access rights to another subject (delegate) to perform     an activity 
on behalf of the former. The delegate should always be a person with reasonable 
skills and experience. Delegation increases the success of or- ganizations 
because the whole team becomes responsible to complete tasks. Effective 
delegation also saves time because tasks are delegated to group members, which 
decreases delays in accomplishing tasks. 
– Reflect the organization structure: The access control service must reflect the 
structure of the organization. An organization typically expresses this struc- 
ture in the form of superior and inferior positions such that superior employ- 
ees have more privileges compared to inferior employees. RBAC supports the 
role hierarchy feature to meet the structural requirement of organizations. 
– Simplified Security Administration: Organizations require that permissions 
should be assigned to the subjects’ job functions rather than to their iden- 
tities. This is desirable because new employees join the organization and 
existing employee may leave the organization. Compared to the existing ac- 
cess control systems, the use of roles simplifies the administration of security 
policies and reduces the administration cost [4] [7]. For instance, if an or- 
ganization assigns a new responsibility to a subject, the subject’s existing 
role needs to be revoked and a new one will be assigned according to the 
new duty of that individual. Consequently, RBAC eliminates the burden of 
creating permission for each employee in the organization. 
– Separation of Duty Principles: All organizations should separate functional 
responsibilities. Organizations must enforce the separation of duty principles 
to deter the possibility of fraud. This is due to the fact that proper separation 
of duties is vital for the implementation of effective access control. RBAC 
supports the separation of duty principles which assures that mistakes, inten- 
tional or unintentional, cannot be made without being discovered by another 
  
 
person [4]. These principles may be enforced at the design time or during 
run-time. Design-time enforcement prevents circumstances that should never 
occur. For instance, a financial manager should never be allowed to be an 
auditor as well. However, run-time enforcement ensures that permissions are 
not misused. 
– Policy-Neutrality: Many organizations require policy-neutral access control 
systems that can express a wide range of security policies. RBAC is widely 
regarded as a policy-neutral system because it has the potential to express a 
wide range of access control policies by using permissions, constraints and 
role-hierarchies [4]. The feature of policy neutrality means that RBAC can 
be configured to enforce different policies, such as discretionary access con- 
trol (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC). Osborn et al. [25] have 
presented a systematic construction to generate both of the traditional ac- 
cess control mechanisms from the standard RBAC. It is worth noticing that 
RBAC components such as subjects and permissions are necessary to express 
any access control system. RBAC can be used to generate DAC policies be- 
cause DAC also rely on a large number of administrative roles, which play 
an important role in enforcing DAC policies. Similarly, the role hierarchy 
feature plays a vital role in generating mandatory access control e.g, the 
lattice-based access control (LBAC). Thanks to the policy-neutrality fea- 
ture, RBAC is not confined to a specific single organization. 
– Special Administrative Roles: Each organization is typically partitioned into 
several departments such that each department manages its own functions 
independently. RBAC can be configured to define special administrative roles 
to meet the requirements of such organizations [26]. An administrative role 
is a special type of role that describes the ability of the subject belonging to 
that administrative role to manage role assignments. This characteristic of 
RBAC makes it a powerful system to meet the needs of diverse scenar- ios 
including the Internet-of-Things (IoT), Social Networks, Healthcare and so 
on. Such large systems consist of multiple domains or units such that a 
special administrative role will be responsible to manage each domain inde- 
pendently. These special administrative roles will independently perform the 
management of roles and permissions. 
– Improved productivity of organizations: Many organizations demand an effi- 
cient access control system that requires reduced cost. RBAC has the poten- 
tial to enhance organizational productivity by improving the systems that or- 
ganizations use to structure their information systems. Thanks to the flexibil- 
ity and the higher level of abstraction, the RBAC system can efficiently sup- 
port changes in the organizational structure. RBAC promotes new ways of 
structuring the organization, thereby affecting the organization’s productiv- 
ity. Finally, RBAC supports the management of access control policies across 
different divisions or units within the organization such that each division or 
unit has its own administrative user who can assign/revoke roles/permissions 
[7]. Indeed, several administrative roles can be defined, depending on the or- 
ganization’s requirement, to efficiently manage the policy management task. 
  
 
2.3 Blockchain 
The Bitcoin was the first cryptocurrency which exploited and emerged the 
blockchain to the world in 2009 [27]. Bitcoin is essentially a decentralized cash 
system to transfer money in a peer-to-peer (P2P) mode without relying on a third 
party (i.e., a bank). Blockchain technology was initially developed to pro- vide 
cryptocurrency services in a secure way without depending on a third party. 
Thereafter, many alternative cryptocurrencies (electronic cash) have entered the 
scene using similar structures. Nowadays, this technology is exploited for appli- 
cations beyond cryptocurrencies. 
Blockchain is basically a distributed ledger technology that accepts transac- 
tions from the users and organizes these transactions into blocks. Each block con- 
tains a set of transactions. These blocks are broadcasted to the P2P blockchain 
network where they are confirmed by the participating nodes in the blockchain 
network. The newly approved block is appended to the existing block in such  a 
way that the new one contains a cryptographic hash of the directly previous 
block. Indeed, the hashing process is essential to improve the security of the 
blockchain because any alteration in a single block will change the hashes for 
the linked blocks as well. Consequently, conflicting copies of the shared ledger 
will emerge and the state of the blockchain will become inconsistent. The term 
shared ledger is commonly used to describe the blockchain because the ledger is 
shared among the peers in the blockchain network such that each peer is capa- 
ble to directly access a copy of the distributed ledger. It is worth noticing that 
blockchain uses a synchronization process through which a node communicates 
with other nodes to request and import the latest blockchain data. The pos- sible 
applications of blockchain technology go beyond Bitcoin. The blockchain 
technology has the following characteristics. 
 
– Data Auditability and Transparency: Every executed transaction and the data 
structures stored in the blockchain are publicly visible to all peers in the 
network. 
– Decentralized: A decentralized solution which is operated without the sup- 
port of a central authority. 
– Consensus: Instead of a central authority, the participating nodes in the 
blockchain network validate all the broadcasted transactions. 
– Information Distribution: The information is distributed to each node in the 
network to ensure availability and consistency. 
– Security: Malicious users cannot misuse the blockchain because it is tamper- 
resistant. 
Security, auditability and a decentralized design are the principal qualities of 
blockchain technology. These features make the blockchain and ideal candidate 
to design a scalable Role-based access control solution for organizations as well 
as for the resource owners. 
A smart contract is a program to perform a specific task [28]. Basically, a 
smart contract contains a program code and a storage file. A contract may read or 
write data to its storage file when users send transaction to it. The user writes 
  
 
the programs, compiles it and then deploys it on a smart contract platform. 
Besides Ethereum, a number of alternative blockchain platforms have emerged 
over the last few years that support the functionality of smart contracts [29]. For 
instance, Stellar, Monax, and EOS are the new emerging platforms that enable 
users to write smart contracts to accomplish different tasks. It is worth noticing 
that each platform uses different programming language to write the program 
code. A contract creation transaction is usually used to deploy a new contract on 
the blockchain, and the contract logic is executed by  sending transaction  to it. 
Moreover, such transactions are invoked by  the participating nodes in  the 
blockchain who reach agreement on its output and modify the blockchain 
accordingly. 
Consensus is a challenging problem in distributed systems that involves a 
set of agents to jointly decide a given value required for computational tasks. 
Each blockchain platform exploits a consensus protocol to reach an agreement 
about the next block to be included into the blockchain. It is worth noticing that 
a trustworthy consensus process needs reliable agents in the network. Different 
consensus algorithms have been proposed for blockchains platforms including the 
Proof-of-Work (PoW), Proof-of-Stake (PoS), Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS), 
Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP) and Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm 
(RPCA). Each consensus mechanism has its own advantages and limitations  in 
terms of energy consumption, security and power consumption. The DPoS 
algorithm is energy-efficient and secure compared to the PoW algorithm [14]. 
The PoW decentralized consensus algorithm requires a certain level of difficulty 
to produce new blocks in the blockchain network. This mechanism checks the 
validity of each broadcasted block in the blockchain network. The miners reach 
a common agreement on a newly broadcasted block and add it to the chain. The 
added block cannot be modified due to the immutability property of blockchain. 
On the contrary, the latest DPoS algorithm [13] exploits participants’ votes to 
elect the block producer (BP) node to generate new blocks. The system uses 
maintenance interval to shuffle the BP. Each block producer can generates 6 
blocks with a block time of 0.5 seconds. If a block producer misses a block, then 
simply an empty block is appended to the chain. It is worth noticing that the 
system removes a BP from consideration if it has not generated any block within 
the last 24 hours. 
Furthermore, cost, consistency, extensibility, security, performance and scal- 
ability are the critical success factors affecting the decision to adopt the right 
blockchain technology for solving problems [30]. A blockchain network imposes 
certain costs for running the network. For instance, transaction fee indicates a 
variable cost to run transactions, smart contract deployment cost and incen- tives 
cost for processing transactions. We note that transaction fees in Bitcoin have 
raised up to 40 USD. Ethereum uses a cost for instruction approach and it then 
calculates the overall cost of transactions. However, the EOS implementa- tion 
does not charge transaction fees while performing millions of transactions per 
second [12]. Consistency is a function of the time to confirmation (e.g., 60 min 
for Bitcoin, 1 minute for Ethereum and 1 sec for EOS). Different tech- 
  
 
niques have been used to ensure that a transaction is added to the blockchain. A 
transaction is appended to the blockchain after generating a certain num-  ber of 
blocks. For instance, the Ethereum platform waits for the generation of 12 blocks 
after adding a transaction into the chain. Consistency primarily de- pends on the 
block production rate (BPR). Possible values for time to confirma- tion are: 
seconds, minutes and hours. Possible values for block production rate are: 10 
minutes or more, 1 to 10 minutes and seconds. Extensibility determines whether 
the platform is extensible through smart contract and decentralized ap- plications 
(DAPPs). Bitcoin has a limited support for decentralized applications and smart 
contracts. However, Ethereum and EOS platforms are extensible be- cause they 
support the functionality of these additional useful features. Some blockchain 
platforms provide ad-hoc languages such as Solidity in Ethereum to support 
turing-complete smart contract. On the contrary, other platforms such as the EOS 
supports traditional languages to write the code of a smart contract. Scalability 
refers to the capability of the blockchain to server more users and transactions. 
For instance, the PoW algorithm offers good scalability with poor performance, 
whereas the DPOS algorithm offers better scalability with better performance. 
Finally, blockchain provides security in the sense that the data on the public 
ledger cannot be deleted or modified once it is written to the chain. An attacker 
may exploit the vulnerabilities in a blockchain platform to launch an attack. The 
DPoS algorithm provides resistant to several attacks including short range attack 
and selfish mining attack. However, the PoW algorithm is vul- nerable to selfish 
mining attack, Sybil attack [31] and Denial of service attack [32]. It is worth 
noticing that the most popular Bitcoin blockchain platform is designed without 
the functionality of smart contracts. However, alternative im- plementations that 
support this functionality are currently running and some are in development. 
Moreover, blockchain implementations vary in many ways such as their purpose, 
cost and efficiency, among others. The choice to decide which blockchain 
platform should be adopted for a given application, it is necessary to recognize 
the differences among them. Table 1 shows a comparative analysis of the popular 
blockchain platforms in terms of interchain communication, allowing multiple 
parallel blockchains to interoperate retaining their security properties and other 
essential features. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparative analysis of the popular blockchain platforms 
Features Bitcoin Ethereum EOS Stellar 
Smart Contract Limited Yes Yes Limited 
DAPP No Yes Yes No 
Languages C++ Solidity Any Any 
Confirmation Time 60 min 1 min 1 sec 30 seconds 
Block Production Rate 10 min 10-19 sec 0.5 sec 5 sec 
Consensus Algorithm PoW PoW Delegated PoS Stellar Consensus 
Interchain No No Yes No 
  
 
2.4 EOS Blockchain 
 
EOS is a collection of applications that interact with the blockchain. The EOS 
blockchain platform for developing smart contract and DAPP aims to address    the 
scalability problem found in existing blockchain platforms such as Ethereum and 
Bitcoin. This smart contract platform aims to  eliminate  transaction  fees while 
conducting millions of transactions per second. The EOS blockchain is de- signed 
as a peer-to-peer  blockchain  network that utilizes  optimized techniques  to 
function in a  particular  execution  environment.  The  consensus mechanism in 
this blockchain largely depends on the 21 block producers. These block pro- ducers 
are mainly responsible for computation on the data and for coordinating updates 
across the blockchain network [16]. Moreover, they process transactions in the 
blockchain network to reach a common consensus among all the indi- vidual 
databases within the EOS network. This platform relies on the C++ programming 
language to write the code of smart contracts and it possesses the high potential for 
scaling due to the Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) consensus mechanism [33]. 
The core components of EOS blockchain include Nodeos, Cleos and Keosd. 
Nodeos validates/syncs blocks in the network. EOS classifies nodes into produc- 
ing nodes (block producers) and non-producing nodes that are associated with 
EOS accounts [16]. Developers can exploit the remote procedure call (RPC) API 
to implement non-producing nodes. Moreover, these nodes can also serve as 
private endpoints for applications that require the EOS system for local de- 
velopment. Cleos provides a command line interface allowing clients to interact 
with the EOS blockchain by sending transactions. Clients request resources from 
the block producers (BPs), which are primarily responsible to host, deliver and 
manage resources on a demand basis. The Keosd component runs on local com- 
puters to stores private keys locally. Keosd is essentially a key manager service 
daemon for storing private keys and signing digital messages. It provides a secure 
key storage medium for keys to be encrypted in the associated wallet file [33]. 
Figure 1 shows the basic architecture of EOS blockchain. We now discuss the 
essential elements of the EOS blockchain in the following section. 
EOS account names consist of short convenient usernames that are at most 12 
characters in length [34]. An EOS account is basically a set of public and private 
key.  The public key serves as the home address for a user to receive tokens   or 
transactions and it can be openly and freely shared with the community. 
However, the private key is secret and only known to the owner of the EOS 
account. Consequently, an EOS account is controlled by the private key, has EOS 
tokens, and used to perform all the transactions in the EOS blockchain network. 
These transactions, in turn, perform some actions on the blockchain network by 
executing methods of the smart contract. It is worth noticing that key generation 
is essential to create accounts, where the generated keys are associated with their 
corresponding wallets. The Cleos application provides instructions to perform 
this operation. Moreover, all the components operate together to publish the 
newly created account within the network. Cleos sends request to Nodeos to 
generate accounts and publish them into the network. Users import 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Basic Architecture of EOS blockchain 
 
 
their private keys into their wallets using the Cleos tool.  Consequently,  EOS  exploits 
the keys associated with users’ accounts to sign all the  actions performed  in the 
network. Moreover,  when  creating  multiple  wallets,  a  user  must  import  the required 
keys into these wallets to successfully create signatures for signing transactions. Finally, 
EOS accounts exploit trust techniques to  validate  actions.  Block Producers will be 
able to suspend an account if it violates this trust  mechanism. Indeed, trust mechanism 
is the only option which is used by the consensus protocol to eliminate bad actors from 
the network [16]. 
Within EOS blockchain system, a transaction consists of a set of instruc- 
tions to modify the state of the chain. An EOS transaction essentially represents 
the execution of actions. Transactions can be sent to perform a single action or 
multiple actions. The state of EOS blockchain will change when a transaction is 
successfully executed. A transaction sent to execute the function of a smart 
contract performs some action according to the instructions in that function. 
However, to execute the function of a smart contract, users must be registered 
and associated with EOS accounts. A transaction may specify some input pa- 
rameters when executing the function of a smart contract. 
The EOS blockchain has created a more robust architecture than Ethereum 
for smart contract and DAPP development. A smart contract in the EOS en- 
vironment consists of variables and methods that perform operations on the 
variables. The methods of an EOS smart contract can be executed by sending 
action requests that are stored within the EOS database framework [33]. The 
EOS platform compiles the source code of a smart contract into bytecode so that 
the EOS virtual machine can execute it. Moreover, the EOS blockchain defines 
smart contracts in terms of action and action handlers. An action is es- sentially 
a call to a method of smart contract whereas action handlers performs the tasks 
of the requested actions. Actions can also be sent to access the private database 
associated with a smart contract. For instance, our RBAC smart con- 
  
 
tract has an associated database containing role-based access control policies. A 
storage device, service provider or even third parties send actions to check access 
permissions in the blockchain. 
Finally, the EOS blockchain supports the C++ programming language to 
write the code of smart contracts. This code will be compiled down to Web 
Assembly (i.e., WASM) format and then invoked in the EOS virtual machine 
[34]. WASM can be used to compile the code for various high-level languages such 
as Rust, C and C++. In simple words, WASM provides instructions that the EOS 
virtual machine recognizes. Moreover, WASM is a web standard specifying the 
binary instruction format for a stack-based virtual machine [16] [35]. Thus, it 
can be executed in several environments including the latest web browsers. 
 
2.5 Related Work 
To the best of our knowledge, a few Blockchain-based access control systems 
have been recently presented, which exploit either the Ethereum or the Bitcoin 
platform for access control decisions. Maesa et al. [36] developed a parser to 
translate Attribute-based access control policies to smart contract. They use 
smart contract to facilitate the process of policy creation, revocation and eval- 
uation using the public Ethereum blockchain network. However, the Ethereum 
blockchain is not scalable and transactions are not cost-free. 
Third parties should not be trusted for storing users’ personal sensitive data 
because they are vulnerable to misuse and attacks. Zyskind et al. [37] merge the 
blockchain and off-blockchain storage to design a personal data management 
platform which is particularly privacy-centered. This platform primarily pro- 
tects the privacy of mobile users who download various third-party applications 
for different purposes. These mobile applications constantly collect high amount 
of personal data from the users without their knowledge and control. Their 
proposed platform protects against different types of privacy problems such as 
ensuring data ownership privacy to allow users to own and control their own per- 
sonal data, ensuring data transparency to make the data collection transparent to 
the users, and ensuring access control to control access to the users’ personal 
data. Their proposed solution is simply based on two types of transactions: ac- 
cess transactions control access to resources whereas data transactions are used 
for data storage and retrieval. It is worth noticing that they use a pointer to   the 
data on the blockchain and an off-blockchain key-value store (a distributed 
hashtable) to process data transactions. However,  the authors simply propose  a 
theoretical access control solution without concrete implementation. In other 
words, their work is mainly focused on the read operations of the users’ stored 
data, without focusing on the access control problem for users’ sensitive data. 
Moreover, their solution is based on the Bitcoin blockchain platform, which has 
a major scalability problem. 
A. Ouaddah et al. [38] use the computing capability of blockchain to enforce 
access control decisions. Their scheme uses the blockchain as a decentralized 
access control manager. Access tokens, which represent authorization, can be 
transferred from one user to another using transactions. Moreover, they insert 
  
 
access control policies into the locking scripts of transactions. The receiving user 
needs to unlock the locking script to verify the ownership of the token. However, 
tokens are not implemented using smart contracts and locking scripts have a lim- 
ited computing capability. It is worth noticing that their proposed access control 
system is based on the organization-based access control (OrBAC). However, Or- 
BAC has several drawbacks such as lack of support to meet the interoperability, 
collaboration and distribution needs for distributed structures, which are critical 
aspects in distributed environments. Therefore, it can handle only policy-based 
compatible systems and use cases, which cannot be applied to numerous IoT 
contexts. Though their solution takes simple context information such as time 
and location into consideration, it does not support constraints such as separa- 
tion of duty and advanced context attributes such as date, birthday, affiliation to 
an organization, employee’s salary or nationality. Finally, their solution is based 
on the Bitcoin blockchain platform which has a major scalability problem. 
Ali et al. [39] propose an access control solution exploiting blockchain tech- 
nology. The main actors of the proposed smart home scenario include a cloud 
storage, service provider and user devices. Access control policies are stored in 
the policy header of a local private blockchain. Each home miner manages the 
outgoing and incoming access requests to the smart home. Furthermore, smart 
homes form an overlay network that contains users’ devices, cloud storage to- 
gether with the service provider. The overlay network makes their proposed 
architecture distributed. All the nodes in the overlay are groups into clusters such 
that each cluster maintains a cluster head, which is responsible to main- tain a 
public blockchain. Each smart home device relies on the cloud storage  to share 
data in the network. However, the overlay network further increases network 
delay and overhead. Moreover, the private blockchain operates with- out the 
Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus algorithm, which is necessary to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the access control technique. Also, the authors did not provide 
detailed experimental results such as throughput, latency and resource 
consumption. It is worth noticing that their solution rely on simple policies 
without taking constraints and exceptions into consideration. To eliminate the 
overlay overhead and introduce trustworthiness using the DPoS protocol, each 
home owner will create RBAC policies using his personal RBAC smart contract 
deployed on the EOS blockchain. In addition, each smart home would execute 
the check access function of our proposed RBAC smart contract to check per- 
missions for the incoming and outgoing access requests. For better availability, 
data can be stored in the distributed Interplanetary File System (IPFS). Our 
RBAC smart contract first checks the subject-role relationship to fetch the role 
assigned to a requesting subject. It then references the role-permission relation- 
ship to identify the permission (operation, object). In this case, operations can 
be either store, monitor, access, etc., while object indicates the ID of the target 
device. The check access function of our RBAC contract returns a BOOLEAN 
true or false decision, representing allow or deny, respectively. 
Zhang et al. [40] propose a smart contract-based framework consisting of 
multiple access control contracts, one judge contract, and one register contract, 
  
 
to achieve a trustworthy access control systems. However, the access control 
contracts are based on a simple Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanism 
which incurs high administrative overhead. Moreover, the Ethereum platform 
has a major scalability problem. The architecture of their proposed framework 
consists of a server, storage device, user devices, IoT gateway and IoT devices. 
The server provides various services for users by interacting with the storage 
device and IoT devices. The storage device stores data for sensors, users and 
server. A user can use different devices such as laptop, PC and smart phone   to 
access services from the server and read or write data to the storage device. Each 
IoT gateway uses a short-range communication technology such as Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, etc. to connect a group of IoT devices. Finally, IoT devices primarily 
include sensors, which observe environmental data and send it to the storage de- 
vice or server for further processing. It is worth noticing that this scheme incurs 
high storage and communication cost because the access control list does not 
consider subjects’ information in the policies. Consequently, they have stored an 
additional register contract in the blockchain, which requires the ID of the re- 
source owner and returns information about the access control contract deployed 
on the blockchain. 
Rahman et al. [41], exploit the Ethereum Blockchain to implement a cost- 
effective, flexible, auditable and trustworthy role-based access control system to 
control access to resources. The system was implemented as a smart contract and 
deployed on the Ethereum Rinkeby testnet. The resource owner uses the public key 
of the subject to create auditable RBAC policies, while the corresponding private 
key is used to decrypt the private data of the resource owner. The sys-   tem is 
auditable because the policies are transparently stored in the blockchain. However, 
the Ethereum blockchain is not scalable. 
The increasing convenience of mobile healthcare has raised several chal- 
lenges for healthcare providers and policy makers [42]. Mobile Ad hoc Network 
(MANETs) and Body Sensor Network (BSN) provide the foundation to integrate 
mobile healthcare with our daily lives. These network supports the mobility of 
patients. However, the mobility of patients raises new challenges for access con- 
trol in mobile healthcare [43]. Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) can be 
used to obtain patients’ positioning information. Moreover, we need to investi- 
gate which mobility model will provide better accuracy as patients move from 
one location to another location [44] [45] [46]. 
 
3 Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 
 
RBAC simplifies the complicated form of an organization’s access control policy. 
RBAC exploits the various roles in an organization to perform the access con-  trol 
decisions. RBAC is a form of non-discretionary access control in which the issuer 
grants a role’s permission to a subject by assigning that subject to role. The issuer 
gives access permissions to roles, and subjects are endowed with roles according to 
their job functions and tasks/obligations. RBAC represents access rights as 
authorization policies which describes what actions a subject is permit- 
  
 
ted (or forbidden) to perform on a set of target objects. Moreover, tasks/duties   are 
represented as obligation policies which describe what actions a subject must or 
must not perform on a set of target objects. Roles can be assigned to a subject and 
revoked to support change in the organization structure, without changing   the 
policies [47]. RBAC efficiently manages access control policy because per- 
missions are associated with roles, not with subjects. Many variations of RBAC are 
proposed in the literature, but the basic architecture of RBAC  is that roles   are 
granted to subjects and permissions are associated with roles (not directly  with 
subjects) [1]. 
 
3.1 Role-based Access Control Components 
The essential components of RBAC include subjects, roles, objects and permis- 
sions [48]. Individual users in RBAC are called subjects. A subject can be a 
human being, a mobile device, a peer, a robot, etc. A role or title is often used 
to represent the capability of a subject to access resources. An object can be 
simply defined as an entity that receives or holds some information. Permission 
indicates the specified mode of access to a resource in the system. RBAC is 
based on the concept that permissions are linked with roles and subjects are 
made members of suitable roles present in an organization so that they can access 
the objects in that organization [19]. 
The basic RBAC comprises subject-role relationship and role-permission rela- 
tionship to define the access structure. An effective implementation of RBAC re- 
quires a thorough understanding of both pairs of the RBAC 3-tuple, i.e. subject- 
role and role-permission relationships. These many-to-many relationships repre- 
sent the access control policy of RBAC. The issuer decides these types of relation- 
ships. Moreover, these essential components accumulatively determine the access 
rights of a particular subject to access a particular resource. When a subject sends 
an access request, the subject-role relationship is referenced to determine which 
role is assigned. Moreover, the role-permission relationship is referenced to decide 
the permission associated with an assigned role. Subject-role relationship 
represents collection of subjects and roles. Subject-role relationship operation 
grants role to a subject and maintains the subject-role relationship database  that 
contains information about the roles assigned to subjects [49]. Subject-role 
relationship is a critical administrative function which is decentralized and del- 
egated to subjects. The issuer directly configures these components or defines 
administrative roles to configure them. Subject-role relationship can be easily 
modified to meet the changing needs of organizations. Sandhu et al. [50] have 
proposed an RBAC system called URA97 that extensively focuses on subject- 
role relationship. They claim that URA97 can be applied to any RBAC system 
because subject-role relationship is a fundamental administrative function which 
will be necessary in any RBAC system. However, URA97 is designed to have a 
very narrow scope. It is worth noticing that subject-role relationship needs to be 
decentralized to make the system scale to large systems. To provide greater 
flexibility and granularity, modern RBAC supports two relations: subject-role 
relationship and role-permission assignment [21]. To explain the role-permission 
( ) 
 
 
 
relationship in detail, we first provide an overview of the structure of permission 
in modern RBAC. 
Permission (an operation, object pair) consists of obligation and authoriza- 
tion [51]. According to [47] [21], obligation and authorization expressions are 
represented as follows: 
identifter, mode, role, action, target, constraints, exception 
[identifier]: uniquely identifies the permission 
[mode]: a:authorization, o:obligation, +:positive,-:negative 
[role]: role which can exploit this permission 
[action]: operation that the role can perform 
[target]: represents the target object to apply the operation 
[Constraints]: restrict permissions based on time period or working day 
[exceptions]: other conditions (exceptional) 
The role-permission (R-P) relationship applies permission to a role group.   The 
permission is uniquely identified by an Identifier. The mode of the policy 
represents authorization such as positive authorization (permitted: A+),  neg-  ative 
authorization (forbidden: A-) and obligations such as positive obligation (must: O+) 
and negative obligation (must not: O-). In general, a positive pol-     icy is 
represented by  +, while a negative is represented by  -. Role indicates     the type 
of role that can use this permission. Action  represents the operation   that the role 
can perform. Target represents the object influenced by action in permission. 
Constraints are the essential feature of RBAC because they restrict permissions 
depending on the information provided, e.g., a specific weekday or    a time period. 
Exception represents exceptional condition for permissions to be executed or not, 
e.g., if R-P contains a negative (–)  mode then the specified   role cannot execute 
this permission, but if some specified exceptional condition occurs then permission 
will be executed. Exceptional conditions could be, for example, an emergency or 
accident role. For instance, Bob can specify an emer- gency exception with negative 
mode so that subjects working in the emergency department could perform the 
operation listed in Bob’s role-permission rela- tionship. On the contrary, if R-P 
contains a positive (+) mode then only the specified role can execute this 
permission. Finally, obligation such as “a doctor must read the patient’s 
document (e.g., file3) every afternoon at 1:00 PM” can be simply expressed as dc1, 
o+, doctor, read, file3, every 1:00, -. In addition, an authorization such as “a 
student can read an article (e.g, file7) of a professor” can be represented as st1, 
a+, student, read, file7, -, -. 
A study [52] conducted by NIST demonstrates that the roles assigned to subjects 
change frequently due to job promotion, departure and arrival of new employees. 
When a user’s  job responsibility changes within an organization,     a proper 
mechanism is necessary to simply delete membership in the existing   role and grant 
a new membership according to the new responsibility of that   user. Similarly, 
when a person leaves an organization, all roles that are assigned  to that person need 
to be revoked. However, role-permission relationships are usually predefined and 
change less frequently. Consequently, both assignment operations should be made 
as simple as possible so that these require less tech- 
  
 
nical skills. Indeed, smart contract can be programmed to define user-friendly 
functions to accomplish these tasks. The term user-friendly means that the is- 
suer only needs to specify, for example in a Role Assignment Transaction, the 
ID of the subject and the role that needs to be granted. The NIST study team 
met with 28 organizations to know about their security requirements. They ar- 
gue that the role-based access control is a better choice for organizations which 
experience a large turnover of personnel. They also argue that privacy problems 
were considered particularly critical in several organizations such as healthcare, 
educational and financial and banking institutions. 
 
4 Blockchain-based RBAC System 
 
Our approach follows the role engineering process presented in [22] to identify 
roles in an organization. First, the organization is partitioned into different units 
or departments according to the responsibilities of these departments. Second, 
each department is then partitioned into different divisions according to the types 
of jobs in that department. For instance, the finance department could be 
partitioned into divisions such as accountants, secretaries and managers. In the 
third step, the different positions are created as roles. In the fourth step, supe- 
rior private roles are identified where the permissions are not inherited upwards. 
Private roles are superior to their corresponding positions in the role hierarchy. 
Fifth, task-based roles need to be identified which represent the tasks or duties 
that individual users must perform. In the next step, subjects are assigned suit- 
able roles according to their positions and duties. Finally, permissions need to 
be assigned to roles to allow subjects in the organization to perform operations 
on resources. 
Enterprise and subjects’ policies represent the two main types of policies 
in various enterprises. An enterprise policy describes the enterprise subject-role 
relationship, role-permission relationship and role-hierarchy. Individual subjects 
define their own RBAC policies containing the subjects’ role-permission rela- 
tionship and constraints. Figure 2 shows the architecture of our proposed scal- 
able RBAC system using the EOS blockchain technology. Each enterprise has a 
unique RBAC contract deployed on the EOS blockchain that accepts policy 
ownership transactions only from the issuer in that enterprise. Our RBAC con- 
tract contains the necessary functions to allow the issuer to create, update and 
revoke these policies in the blockchain. Most importantly, each resource owner 
in an organization may have some resources that are needed by other subjects 
(in the same or different organization). Consequently, all resource owners must 
control access to resources to prevent unauthorized access to resources. The ser- 
vice provider should be able to restrict the access requests from unauthorized 
subjects to perform operations on the stored data. An organization requires scal- 
able role-based access control policies because many subjects are involved in it. 
Obviously, the Ethereum blockchain is not suitable due to scalability issue and 
transaction fees. Technically, conventional access control mechanisms can only be 
used to meet the security requirements of enterprises containing small number of 
  
 
subjects. As a result, conventional mechanisms are not sufficient and complex to 
manage when we consider a large system involving many subjects from different 
organizations. To support autonomous policies for subjects, registered subjects 
associated with EOS accounts send transactions to the RBAC smart contract to 
delegate access rights. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Scalable Managment of RBAC policies using the EOS blockchain 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the blockchain-pull architecture of our proposed RBAC sys- 
tem. It consists of an Issuer, subjects, service provider and the EOS blockchain 
system. The issuer in an organization creates RBAC policies for all subjects working 
in that organization. The issuer sends transactions to the blockchain       to create, 
update and revoke these policies depending on the requirements of     the 
organization. The subject-role relationship defines which subject is assigned  to 
which roles in which organization. The issuer sends a transaction to grant a  role to 
a subject when the former agrees to create an RBAC policy for a sub-    ject working 
in the organization. A subject sends access request with his/her ID 
(EOS public key) to the service provider to perform an operation on a certain 
resource. The service provider first authenticates 3 the subject and it then pulls 
subject’s role authorization information from the blockchain as shown in Figure 
3. 
Although we propose to store objects in the service provider, our approach 
is also feasible if the resources are stored in the Interplanetary File System 
(IPFS) [53], which is a distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) file system that shares the 
same system of files with all computing devices. Moreover, IPFS provides a 
high-throughput storage medium with content-addressed hyperlinks. IPFS uses 
 
3 The authentication mechanism is not described in this paper, since it can be sup- 
ported by any existing authentication technologies in different ways 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Block Diagram for blockchain-pull architecture 
 
 
a combination of technologies such as distributed hash table (DHT) and self- 
certifying namespaces, etc. The main advantage of IPFS over the service provider 
would be no single point of failure, and without requiring nodes to trust each 
other. Another advantage of IPFS over service provider is that the data is stored 
in a distributed way in various places of the world. Storing and retrieving files 
from an IPFS work in the same way as the Web. Each uploaded file has a unique 
hash string which can be used to retrieve that file. The hash string essentially 
resembles the uniform resource locator (URL) used in the web today. The hash 
string can be seen as the location of the uploaded file. It is  worth noticing  that 
blockchains are not appropriate for storing large files due to gas fees and 
transparency property of current blockchain platforms. In case when files are 
stored in the IPFS, our blockchain-based RBAC could require a few steps to 
check access permissions in the blockchain. When a subject sends a request to 
  
 
perform an operation on a certain resource, the IPFS will use the traditional 
RBAC triplets to check access permissions in the blockchain. Therefore, the 
IPFS will return location of the file only if the subject has been successfully 
authenticated and authorized. It is important to note that IPFS could be an ideal 
choice to store data if several organizations collaborate to accomplish a common 
goal. 
Finally,  the Check Access  function implements the access control function  of 
our blockchain-based RBAC system. This function requires the traditional access 
control triplet (subject ID, operation, object) as input attributes. This function first 
checks the subject-role relationship in the blockchain to verify the role membership 
of the requesting subject. Moreover, it checks the associated role-permission 
relationship to determine access permission in the blockchain. This function returns 
a BOOLEAN true or false, representing allow or deny, respectively. Finally, our 
blockchain-based RBAC provides a clear interface to other components that use 
RBAC as their access control service. Figure 4 shows  a generic access request 
scenario as message sequence chart. A subject (left side) sends a request to perform 
an operation on a certain object (right side). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: A generic access request scenario 
 
 
 
4.1 Delegations 
 
Some environments require that users should be able to transfer the access rights 
to other users for different reasons. The basic concept behind the delegation 
mechanism is that some active entity in a system assigns the access rights to an- 
other entity to perform some functions on behalf of the former. Delegation has 
been continuously recognized as an essential concept to increase flexibility in 
controlling access to resources. Our proposed blockchain-based RBAC supports 
delegation capabilities using gaseless transactions which makes it adoptable and 
appealing in a large number of application scenarios. Our RBAC smart con- tract 
supports two types of delegations (i) administrative delegation and (ii) 
− 
− 
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user delegation [24]. An administrative delegation requires the services of an ad- 
ministrative user (issuer) to only grant access rights to a subject. The term only 
grant means that the administrative user cannot use the access rights, but only 
assigns it to a subject. On the contrary, a user delegation enables a subject to 
transfer a subset of his available access rights to another subject. For instance, a 
subject may delegate the access rights to another subject when the former is not 
able to perform a given task due to several reasons such as sickness. Unlike 
administrative delegation, a third-party delegation operation requires that the 
subject performing the delegation must be capable to use the access rights. The 
subject who performs a delegation is referred to as a ‘delegator’ and the subject 
who receives a delegation is referred to as a ‘delegate’. 
Our RBAC smart contract currently supports grant delegation operation 
because the delegated access rights are available to both the delegator and del- 
egate. On the contrary, transfer delegation operation transfers the access rights 
to the delegate such that the delegator is no longer able to use the access rights. 
Transfer delegation operation is necessary in scenarios where the access control 
policy specifies that the right r needed to perform a task should be available to 
a certain number of users. For instance, consider an access control policy that 
demands the cooperation of n users to perform a given task. However, if at least 
one of the users is not available due to several reasons to complete the task, then 
users should be able to delegate the access rights to another user, who may 
perform the task on behalf of the unavailable user. Indeed, grant delegation 
cannot be used in such scenarios because it will violate the rules of the policy. 
Consequently, transfer delegation becomes necessary to accomplish delegation 
in such scenarios [54]. 
Our blockchain-based RBAC supports temporary delegations such that sub- ject 
S1 delegates to subject S2 the role R with an expiry time. Consequently, a 
temporary role delegation operation delegate(S1, S2, R, expiry time) guaran- 
tees that the delegation will only remain in the blockchain for the time specified  in 
the expiry time field. However, our simple implementation can be modified to 
delegate(S1, S2, R, start time, end time) or delegate(S1, S2, now(), now() + 
T ) where now is a function that would return the value  of the current time and    T  
represents the duration of delegation in the blockchain. It is worth noticing   that we 
take a time variable in the smart contract to compare the current time  with the 
expiry time field. Our RBAC contract automatically deletes the delega- tion from 
the blockchain when the current time = expiry    time. Nonetheless,   a subject 
can also perform permanent delegation operation without specifying    the expiry 
time field. 
If a subject needs the delegation of a role, the delegator sends delegation 
request message to the blockchain specifying the address of the corresponding 
RBAC smart contract. The delegation request message contains the role that 
needs to be delegated, expiry time, and delegate ID which obtains the new role 
due to the role delegation mechanism. When the blockchain receives the delega- 
tion request message, it references delegation information to decide whether to 
allow the delegation or not. The delegation information consists of permission 
  
 
which has mode and exception. Our blockchain-based RBAC smart contract ref- 
erences the mode for making a decision about whether to permit the delegation   or 
not. The mode of a permission is one of A+, A-, O+ or O-. Permissions       with 
obligation mode O+ and O- cannot be delegated. In other words, right permission 
can be delegated to other roles, but a permission containing a duty cannot be 
delegated [21]. Our blockchain-based RBAC smart contract will either accept or 
reject the request based on the mode of the permission. If the request    is accepted, 
the blockchain sends an accept message to the delegator containing information 
about the delegator, delegate, role, expiry time and condition. The blockchain smart 
contract then sends notification of the delegated role to the delegate. The delegate 
can perform the function of the delegated role once he obtains delegated role 
information. At this time, the delegate can execute the permissions that are specified 
in the corresponding role-permission relationship which is stored in an auditable 
manner in the blockchain. 
After a delegation role has been successfully assigned to a subject, it is stored 
in the blockchain in a custom data structure. The delegate subject will subse- quently 
act as the delegator of this delegated role. If the delegation is single-step, then the 
delegate would not be allowed to further delegate the delegated role. However, the 
delegator could achieve multi-step delegation by setting a Boolean variable 
multiStepDelegatable to true (i.e., 1) for the corresponding delegation in the 
blockchain. Moreover, the delegator can control how often the delegated role can 
be transferred further. To this end, the delegator can specify the value of the 
levelsofDelegation variable, which is automatically set to 1 if no value is specified 
(default). For instance, if the delegator has specified its value equal to 5 then the 
delegate would be able to further delegate the role 5 times. It is important to    note 
that another variable called remaningLevels tracks the number of further 
delegations. The levelsofDelegation variable remains constant during further del- 
egations. However, the remainingLevels variable is automatically decremented 
with each possible further delegation. Consequently, our RBAC smart contract will 
discard further delegations when the value of the latter variable becomes equal to 0. 
It is important to remark that RBAC supports two mechanisms to transfer 
access rights: (i) delegation of roles and (ii) delegating the individual permissions. 
The delegation of a role r empowers the delegate to act in the delegated role r. 
This essentially means that the delegate becomes authorized for r and, conse- 
quently, obtains the privileges associated with r. Delegating a permission p gives 
the delegate the ability to use p. However, all other subjects who are associated 
with the delegate role also obtain the delegated rights [55]. This article focuses 
on both role and permission delegation operations. Both of these operations, 
respectively, trigger changes in subject-role relationship and role-permission re- 
lationship stored in the blockchain. Our blockchain-based RBAC supports the 
following transactions to create and update these delegation relationships. Table 
2 shows the one-time constant resource consumption costs of these transactions. 
 
– The Role Assignment Transaction (RAT) enables an administrative user to 
grant an appropriate role to a subject. The RAT is essentially a self-certified 
  
 
delegation that the issuer performs to grant some role to a Subject. RAT 
requires the subject’ public key and the role that the issuer wants to assign. 
Consequently, it stores the subject-role relationship in the blockchain and 
shows the output when the execution is successfully completed. For the sake 
of simplicity, RAT grants role to a single subject ID only. However, the 
issuer can also assign the same role to multiple subjects in a single RAT 
transaction. It is worth noticing that only an authorized issuer can assign 
roles to subjects in an organization. To this end, our RBAC contract contains 
a special modifier that authorizes the sender of RAT. Moreover, we use a 
custom data structure to store the subject-role relationship in the blockchain 
in an auditable fashion. 
– The issuer sends a Role Update Transaction (RUT) to modify an existing 
subject-role relationship stored in the blockchain. This transaction requires 
the public key of the EOS account of the subject and a new role to re- place 
the existing information in the blockchain. Consequently, it updates the 
subject-role relationship database stored in the blockchain and notifies the 
issuer about the changes that just took place. It is worth noticing that only 
an authorized issuer can update an existing subject-role relationship in the 
blockchain. 
– Our proposed blockchain-based RBAC provides the Right Transfer Transac- 
tion (RTT) transaction to enable a subject to grant his/her available access 
rights to another subject. This mechanism enhances expressiveness and per- 
mits a natural administration model where the issuer can create roles and 
designate other (less privileged) entities to delegate these roles using user del- 
egation. Consequently, a subject (delegator) who is granted a role can send 
a Right Transfer Transaction (RTT) to the blockchain to further transfer 
the access rights to another subject. This transaction requires the public key 
of the delegate subject and other relevant information such as expiry time to 
provide temporary delegations that are limited by time. Once the expiry time 
reaches, the RBAC smart contract automatically deletes the delegation from 
the blockchain. Moreover, it notifies the delegator that the public key of the 
delegate has been added to the blockchain when the execution is suc- 
cessfully completed. It is worth noticing that we use a custom data structure 
to store user delegations in the blockchain. 
– The Permission Assignment Transaction (PAT) creates authorizations and 
obligations in the blockchain. Permissions in RBAC cannot be applied to 
subjects directly, but to a role group. This transaction allows the issuer to 
specify mode of the RBAC policy, name of the role, action indicating the 
operation to be processed by role, target object, constraint and other excep- 
tional conditions (if applicable). The execution of this transaction creates a new 
role-permission relation in the blockchain as shown in Figure 2. 
– Permission updating is simply the process of updating a role-permission re- 
lationship in the blockchain. Permission updating is a principal component    of 
role maintenance in role life-cycle. The issuer sends a Permission Up- date 
Transaction to update an existing role-permission relationship in the 
  
 
blockchain. The issuer specifies the new permission set, constraints and ex- 
ceptions to update the existing information in the blockchain. 
 
Though our blockchain-based RBAC currently supports passive delegation, 
it could also be enhanced to support active  delegation. In active delegation,    a 
subject sends a request to delegate another role’s permission to itself. In this case, 
delegator and delegate are both the same subjects. In active delegation, the role-
permission relationship contains an exceptional field with A- mode. Due to the 
transparency property of blockchain, other subjects can check the blockchain to 
determine the value of this exceptional field. Therefore, the delegator would directly 
send a request to the blockchain for the delegation of a particular role if such a role 
meets the above exceptional requirements. On the contrary, passive delegation 
allows a subject to send delegation request to another subject. In this case, delegator 
and delegate are not the same subjects [21]. Consequently, the delegator sends a 
delegation request message to the blockchain to delegate his  role permission to the 
delegate subject. 
 
4.2 Revocation 
 
Revocation is the reverse process of delegation that removes or retracts delga- 
tions from the blockchain. Our approach allows the delegator to remove delega- 
tions at any time. The following subsections discuss the types of revocations and 
address some of the issues that might introduce complexity. 
Our proposed system supports temporary delegation that automatically ex- 
pires with time. We call the delegation period as duration of delegation, which 
must be chosen carefully. The delegators should not overestimate the duration of 
delegation because it allows the delegate to continue to use the permissions asso- 
ciated with the delegated role. Moreover, the duration of delegation should not 
be short enough that would prevent the delegate from completing the assigned 
task. 
Our proposed RBAC supports two types of human revocation operations 
(i) administrative revocation and (ii) user revocation. An administrative revo- 
cation operation requires the service of an administrative human (e.g., issuer) to 
revoke a delegation from the blockchain whereas a user revocation operation 
allows the delegator subject to remove the right transfer from the blockchain. 
The latter approach empowers the delegator to control the behavior of the tem- 
porary delegate. Hence, the delegator is primarily responsible to protect the 
system resources from the delegate. For instance, the delegator should imme- 
diately remove the delegation from the blockchain if the delegate acts badly in 
the delegated role. To overcome this situation, any of the original role members 
should be able to revoke such delegations from the blockchain. Alternatively, 
the issuer can also revoke the delegating role if the delegate behaves badly. In 
particular, our RBAC smart contract supports the following essential human re- 
vocation operations. Table 2 shows the one-time constant resource consumption 
costs of these transactions. 
  
 
– The issuer sends a Role Revocation Transaction (RRT) to delete an exist- 
ing subject-role relation from the blockchain. This transaction requires the 
subject’ public key as input parameter and, consequently, it deletes the cor- 
responding subject-role relation from the blockchain when the execution is 
successfully completed. Moreover, the RBAC smart contract notifies the is- 
suer about the changes in the subject-role relationship database stored in the 
blockchain. It is worth noticing that only an authorized issuer can revoke an 
existing subject-role relationship from the blockchain. To this end, our 
RBAC contract contains a special modifier to authorize the sender of RRT 
transaction. 
– The Permission Revocation Transaction (PRT) deletes an existing role- 
permission relationship from the blockchain. To accomplish this goal, the issuer 
specifies the identifying information of the role-permission relationship to 
delete it from the chain. It is worth noticing that the issuer creates role- 
permission relationship for each distinct role in the system. Consequently,   the 
issuer specifies the existing role in a Permission Revocation Transaction  to 
delete the associated role-permission relationship from the blockchain. 
– Remove Right Transfer: Subjects who have further delegated access rights 
send Remove Right Transfer Transaction (RTT) to the blockchain to remove 
thrid-party delegations from the blockchain. This transaction is essentially 
the reverse operation of the right transfer transaction discussed earlier. Sub- 
jects should not only be able to transfer access rights, but they should also 
be capable to delete right transfers from the blockchain to protect resource 
misuse. 
 
With respect to the revocation operation, a distinction should be made be- 
tween strong and weak revocation. If a subject is simultaneously assigned to a 
senior role R1 and a junior role R2, then a weak revocation of junior R2 would 
only remove assignment in the junior role. However, a strong revocation of junior 
R2 would remove assignment in the junior role as well as assignment in the senior 
role R1. This is due to the fact that senior role R1 inherits the permissions from 
junior role R2. Indeed, a weak revocation operation can be easily accomplished 
because it only requires the same parameters as specified in the RAT transaction. 
However, strong revocation operation cannot be easily accomplished because it 
needs information about explicit and implicit role membership. In this example, 
the user would be explicitly assigned R1 and implicitly assigned R2. In other 
words, a strong revocation operation requires checking the role hierarchy to see 
whether the subject is assigned to a senior role. If such assignment exists, then it 
needs to be removed as well. Further details on how to explicitly and implicitly 
assign roles are outside the scope of this article. 
Our approach supports delegator-dependent revocation such that only the 
delegator is allowed to revoke the delegated role. Indeed, this approach offers 
various advantages such as controlling the process of revocation and resolving 
conflict between the original role members. However, it has also some limita- 
tions such as keeping track of the delegators, the possibility for the delegate to 
misbehave for a long time because other members cannot revoke the delegation 
  
 
and dealing with the delegated role when the delegator is removed from the role 
membership. On the contrary, delegator-independant revocation could also be 
achieved by allowing any original role members to revoke the delegated role. 
This approach would empower the original role members to control the usage of 
the delegated role, which is an advantage because the delegate may act badly in 
the delegate role. However, it can also create conflict between the original role 
members. This happens because any of the original role members can delete such 
delegations from the blockchain. 
Finally, we consider the case of cascading revocation. Suppose that Alice 
delegates (using user delegation) her role membership to Bob to perform some 
task. Alice can latter delete Bob’s delegated access rights from the blockchain 
by sending a remove right transfer transaction to the blockchain. In this case, 
suppose that the issuer sends a transaction to the blockchain to remove Alice 
subject-role relationship from the blockchain. This will result in the automatic 
revocation of Bob’s delegated access rights in role R (and from any roles junior 
to R) as well. The issuer has full authority to remove third-party delegations 
from the blockchain. 
 
4.3 Constraints 
In recent years, highly flexible devices have emerged that are daily used in any part 
of human life. Moreover, the widespread deployment of Internet and net- working 
technologies demand the protection of sensitive information that  can    be accessed 
by subjects and/or machines. The increasing usage of mobile de-  vices in 
organizations also presents a challenge because users require access to protected 
resources from  a  variety  of  settings.  One  of  the  important  aspects of access 
control is the consideration of location and time to control access to critical 
resources. Such constraints are important for controlling location and time-sensitive 
activities that are necessary in various organizations. Indeed, this situation demands 
the provision of customized, decentralized and context-aware role-based access 
control policies. Our fine-grained access control solution ef- ficiently solves this 
problem because the role-permission relationships support context information in 
access control decisions. Our approach allows the  issuer  to rapidly update 
permissions to deal with a dynamically changing contextual information. Moreover, 
our approach creates conditional permissions such that each permission could 
be associated with one or more context constraint. 
The concept of constraints emerged since some of the initial RBAC systems 
were proposed [19] [51]. In these earliest systems, the concept of constraints was 
mainly focused on the restriction of the assignment of subjects and permissions   to 
roles to enforce common access control policies, such as separation of duty. 
However, constraints models were not a part of these initial RBAC systems. RBAC 
constraints can be broadly classified into static and dynamic [56] as discussed 
below; 
Static constraints refer to constraints that can be evaluated directly at design 
time or upon assignment of a role within an RBAC system (e.g. Static Sepa- ration 
of Duty (SoD)). Static constraints are also called assignment constraints 
 
 
 
because they control the assignment of roles and permissions. RBAC delegations 
essentially create a direct relation between subjects and access rights – subject 
S obtains the privileges associated with R only if R has been delegated to S. 
Consequently, constraints that restrict delegation must directly restrict this new 
relation between subject and access rights. Predicates provide a general approach 
to express RBAC constraints. We can simply use the predicate right to show 
this new relation between subject and access right R. 
⊥← right(S, R), γ (1) 
Where γ represents any coexistence of the RBAC basic predicates (i.e., be- 
tween subjects and roles, hold  between roles  and rights)  or any  other predi-  cate 
related to subjects, roles and rights. The above constraint states that both right(S, 
R) and γ cannot be true at the same time. For instance, we assume that the 
declaration junior(X, Y ) states that subject X is junior to subject Y in the 
organization’s role structure. Then we can use the following generic constraint  to 
indicate that a junior cannot receive a right R that is stronger than the one     that 
his senior owns: 
 
⊥← right(S, p); junior(S; boss); play(boss; role); hold(role; q); imply(p; q) (2) 
The constraint that a subject S who can exercise/play the role of a watchman 
does not possess the rights to delegate the duty of locking doors can be expressed 
as follows: 
 
⊥← play(S, watchman), right(S; d(lock − door, 0)) (3) 
Finally, a separation of duty constraint to express the idea that a Subject S 
who can perform task1 cannot also perform task2 can be simply expressed as 
follows: 
 
⊥← right(S; task1), right(S; task2) (4) 
Static constraints are enforced when tuples are added or removed. Tuples 
represents new instances of the subject-role relation and role-permission relation. 
The static constraint must be checked after a transaction insert new instances  of 
these relations. Indeed, the result of checking static constraint would be the 
presence or absence of security violations. A practical implementation of the 
above constraints should not only verify that a security violation has occurred, 
but also report which instantiation of the variables subject and role causes the 
security violation. 
On the contrary,  context constraints refer to constraints that do not relate  to 
the core elements of RBAC but are usually defined as extra conditions for access 
control decisions [3]. These constraints evaluate the subjects’ attributes at run-
time to see whether they match with the pre-defined values (e.g., context 
constraints such as time and location). As shown in Figure 2, context constraints 
are linked with RBAC permissions because RBAC authorization decisions take 
  
 
the role-permission relationship into consideration. A context constraint states 
that certain context attributes must match certain conditions to allow a specific 
operation. A context attribute indicates a certain environmental property whose 
actual value change dynamically. For instance, time, location, date, birthday, 
affiliation to an organization, employee’s salary or even nationality can be used as 
context attributes. Context constraints essentially define conditional permissions 
such that each permission is associated with one or more context constraint. 
Consequently, a subject can perform an operation on an object if and only      if 
each corresponding context constraint evaluates to true. Our RBAC smart 
contract contains constraints variables to store context attributes with different 
data types (e.g., string, date, integer, etc.). Moreover, the RBAC smart contract 
contains a Boolean check constraint function to compare the current value of a 
context attribute with that specified in the RBAC policy. This function checks 
that context constraints associated with a particular permission are not violated. 
A scenario-driven role-engineering process is presented in [3] for the specifica- 
tion and elicitation of context constraint. This process considers the usability of    a 
system to derive permissions and to define tasks. Broadly speaking, a scenario 
describes an action or a sequence of events. Thus, each scenario may consist of    a 
number of steps and a subject must possess all permissions that are required     to 
successfully perform the various steps of this scenario. To obtain context constraints, 
we first identify the goals and obstacles of the scenario under con- sideration. We 
then examine each goal to derive the context attributes that are required to perform 
this specific goal (e.g., date, time, location and so on). Ob- stacles are useful to 
derive context conditions because they essentially define  what should not happen. 
Moreover, this study provides an online examination scenario where a student must 
possess all permissions to perform the various  steps of this scenario such as fetching 
and editing exam documents. When we examine the goals of this scenario, we can 
clearly identify context attributes such as examination date, current time, exam 
document number and so on. Further- more, context conditions can be identified 
from the obstacles of this scenario   such as checking to see whether the client 
(student) IP address is a registered   one, etc. It is worth noticing that this role-
engineering process is applicable to a wide range of scenarios. 
Organizations collaborate to share data and functionality with collaborative 
partners, while controlling access to resources from unauthorized users. Indeed, 
access control policies play an important role to accomplish the tasks of col- 
laborating organizations. However, such collaborative environments require the 
consideration of policies that are capable to explicitly specify which subjects from 
which organizations (contexts) can perform operations on resources. It is worth 
noticing that the basic RBAC [19] does not include any mechanism to specify 
such kind of constraints. On the contrary, the modern RBAC supports context 
attributes such as affiliation to an organization, which can be used to meet the 
security requirements of such collaborative environments. Indeed, dynamic up- 
dating of large number of contexts may bring burden to the administrative user 
because the access control policies need to be modified when adding, removing 
  
 
or updating context attributes. However, our approach allows the administra- 
tive user to modify these policies when adding or removing contexts, thereby 
reducing the administrative burden. 
Although, the significance of RBAC constraints has been realized for a long 
time and different techniques have been proposed to specify and enforce autho- 
rization constraints, still some constraint-related challenges have not received 
much attention from the research community. Initial work on constraints was 
mainly focused on constraints specification rather than enforcement. Authoriza- 
tion constraints can also be expressed in natural languages, such as English,   or 
in more formal languages. Sandhu et. al [57] have proposed a role-based con- 
straints specification language (RCL) which can be used to express authorization 
constraints. RCL can be used by security researchers who are mainly responsi- 
ble to understand the objectives of organizations and express security decisions 
supporting these objectives. On the contrary, the administrative user is mainly 
responsible to process day-to-day operations. Another advantage of RCL is that 
it provides greater flexibility, sharing common semantics to express constraints. 
There are too many possibilities and variations of RBAC constraints. RCL is a 
powerful language because it has the potential to express many constraints pre- 
viously identified in the literature. Humans prefer natural language specification 
due to ease of understanding, but such specification may be prone to ambigu- 
ities. Furthermore, initial research work mainly focused on separation of duty. 
However, other types of constraints such as Binding of Duty (BoD) has received 
less attention from the research community. A simple example of BoD would be 
that a subject can be assigned to role X only if he/she is already assigned to role 
Y. To the best of our knowledge, no research work is dedicated to this topic. 
Constraints can be put into system design in two different ways. First, autho- 
rization constraints can be specified in predicate logic (PL). Context constraints 
of RBAC are defined through the formula construct which can be specified in 
ambient logic (AL). Together these constructs provide a powerful technique to 
specify RBAC policies for smart contracts. Alternatively, constraints specifica- 
tion can be injected into a unified modelling language (UML) representation  of 
RBAC as realized by [58]. UML together with Object Constraint Language 
(OCL) have also been recently considered as fit for blockchain ontology [59]. 
OCL is a declarative language which can be used to describes the rules related 
to UML and is part of the UML standard. OCL is a precise text language that 
can be used with any metal-model to express constraints. 
 
5 Advantages 
 
Our proposed blockchain-based RBAC provides various advantages because the 
blockchain performs the functions of policy management and evaluation. There- 
fore, our proposed system inherits the advantages of blockchain technology such 
as auditability, privacy, distributed with no single point of failure, immutability, 
availability and so on. This section discusses the advantages of our proposed 
approach. 
  
 
5.1 Privacy 
 
Current blockchain systems provide the auditability property to ensure that all 
the users’ actions are transparently stored in the blockchain. Consequently, au- 
ditability may lead to privacy problems. Our blockchain-based RBAC stores all 
the access control policies, and access decisions in the EOS blockchain. However, 
public blockchain platforms are more vulnerable to privacy problems because 
the platform is open to everyone. Therefore, users and even miners can read all 
the data published in the blockchain. To tackle this issue, current blockchain 
platforms offer the pseudonymity feature, which ensures that registered users 
are associated with unique randomly generated identifiers that show no infor- 
mation about the real identities of users. Thanks to the pseudonymity feature, all 
the role-based access control policies and access requests, although trans- 
parently stored, but show no information about the real identities of the users 
who conducted them because we store all the information with anonymous IDs. 
However, the issuers and the resource owners need to know the real identities of 
users when assigning roles to users. Therefore, an attacker is not capable to learn 
sensitive information from the blockchain since anonymous IDs are stored there. 
Finally, an attacker must forge a digital signature or control the majority of 
computing power in the network to alter access permissions in the blockchain. 
Blockchain platforms exploit a signature-based security to prevent the former 
and a decentralized consensus mechanism to prevent the latter. 
Furthermore, some techniques called deanonymization attacks have been pro- 
posed to break users’ pseudonymity. However, these techniques mainly focus on 
the Bitcoin blockchain platform and are based on graph-based analysis. Fur- 
thermore, researchers have recently investigated that graph-based analysis can 
be conducted on the Ethereum platform [60]. It is worth noticing that similar 
techniques are possible for new blockchain platforms. Therefore, new systematic 
approaches are necessary to measure and identify the possibility of such attacks 
on new blockchain platforms such as EOS and Steller. Moreover, a number of 
studies have analysed the vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contract and differ- 
ent attacks have been identified such as the re-entrancy attack. Therefore, our 
research work also opens the door to investigate security vulnerabilities in EOS 
smart contracts. 
Alternative proposals that offer enhanced privacy protection have recently 
emerged such as CoinJoin. CoinJoin allows users to route their transactions 
through a centralized mixing service, which hides the relationships between the 
originators and the receivers of transactions. However, such techniques largely 
rely on the centralized mixing service, which becomes a single point of failure 
and trust. Consequently, the mixing service may steal assets that are routed 
through it. To overcome the limitations of CoinJoin, a number of alternative 
proposals have emerged such as Mixcoin, which aims to eliminate the risk of 
theft by making the mixing service responsible if it steals the assets of a user. 
However, sophisticated cryptographic techniques are necessary to ensure com- 
plete information disclosure. For instance, zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) can be 
  
 
used to hide the private information of users. However, zero-knowledge proofs  are 
complex and have high computation and storage cost [61]. 
Finally, built-in cryptographic primitives can be used to implement privacy- 
preserving smart contracts. The EOS blockchain platform provides built-in cryp- 
tographic primitives such as SHA-3 to encrypt the contract data and calls. EOS 
SHA-3 functions are based on an instance of the keccak algorithm. Therefore, the 
blockchain will store obfuscated information once we take cryptographic hash of 
the contract’s data [16]. The Ethereum platform also provides built-in crypto- 
graphic primitives to implement privacy-preserving smart contracts. However, 
the Ethereum platform incurs extra gas cost for each cryptographic operation 
defined in the smart contract. 
 
5.2 Auditability 
 
The role-based access control policies comprising subject-role relationship and role-
permission relationship are transparently stored in the blockchain. Storing these 
relationships in the blockchain provides various advantages such as the prevention 
of false denial and the transparent verification of permissions. If the service provider 
or third parties falsely deny an operation on a certain resource    to a subject, that 
subject can check  the blockchain at any time to see whether     he has been assigned 
an appropriate role. Moreover, subjects can check the role- permission relationship 
in the blockchain to see what permissions have been associated with the roles that 
are assigned  to  them.  Therefore,  subjects  can  take the necessary actions on time 
such as informing the organization (or the issuer) if some required permissions are 
not present in the blockchain. Due to    the immutability property of blockchain, all 
the actions performed on a smart contract are transparently stored in the log, which 
is accessible on the blockchain. Hence, blockchain provides long term auditability. 
The blockchain provides a trusted execution environment for performing ac- 
cess control decisions and provides a trusted storage for storing access control 
policies. On the contrary, if the access control policies are stored in a medium 
other than blockchain, then it is possible that an adversary could alter the ac- 
cess control decision process or store fake access decision information in the 
associated log file. Obviously, the adversary cannot perform such attacks on the 
blockchain unless it controls more than half of the computing power in   the 
blockchain network, which is assumed to be hard. Our approach improves trust 
through decentralization and by storing the organizations policies on the 
blockchain. It is worth noticing that adopting the Ethereum blockchain for en- 
forcing role-based access control policies introduces some costs to perform policy 
ownership transactions such as role/permission assignment, update and revoca- 
tion. A description of the gas costs for our Ethereum-based implementation is 
given in [62]. Consequently, our research work adopts the EOS permissioned 
blockchain platform to reduce the deployment and execution costs. Indeed, the 
EOS blockchain provides a trusted storage and execution environment, allowing 
only trusted block producers to append new blocks to the chain, and supports 
  
 
gasless transactions to eliminate fees associated with essential transactions such 
as contract deployment, policy creation, update and revocation. 
It is important to remark that auditability in our proposed system concerns 
the storage of role-based access control policies and the evaluation of these poli- 
cies, i.e., the service provider or third parties check access rights by sending 
the traditional access control triplets (subject ID, operation and object) to our 
RBAC smart contract. The smart contract first examines the subject-role rela- 
tionship to fetch the assigned role and it then uses this information to check the 
permission associated with the assigned role. Consequently, our RBAC smart 
contract stores audit data in the associated log file, which can be analysed latter 
to discover or diagnose security violations. Indeed, audit data demands protec- 
tion from modification by an attacker. Thanks to the tamper-resistant charac- 
teristic of blockchain, an attacker cannot modify the audit data stored in the 
blockchain. 
 
 
5.3 Availability, Integrity and Conftdentiality 
 
Availability and integrity result from the persistency property of blockchain. 
That is, once some data is added to the blockchain as a part of a valid  block,  it 
always becomes available and impossible to modify or delete it (integrity). 
Therefore, our blockchain-based RBAC provides a trusted and always available 
environment that permits service providers or third parties to have tamper-proof 
evidence of the users’ access rights before allowing them to perform operations 
on resources. As such, our blockchain-based RBAC successfully defeats mali- 
cious users who may try to create fake policies in the blockchain. It is important 
to remark that each organization has a unique RBAC smart contract deployed 
on the blockchain such that only the administrative user (issuer) is capable to 
perform policy-ownership operations such as policy creation, update and revo- 
cation. EOS smart contract contains special modifier to authorize the sender of 
policy-ownership transactions. Therefore, our RBAC smart contract automati- 
cally rejects requests that are sent from non-administrative users. Moreover, the 
blockchain infrastructure is more resilient to availability attacks such as Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks and impersonation attack. On the contrary, existing 
solutions that are based on a central server are vulnerable to the single point of 
failure and DoS attacks. For instance, the rule-based access control system [63] is 
proposed where policies are expressed in terms of relationships existing between 
subjects. However, the access control rules, decision module and certificates are 
all stored and managed in a central node, which may become a single point of 
failure. Finally, confidentiality checks if the information is leaked to unautho- 
rized peers. It is worth noticing that blockchain utilizes public/private key pair 
as an addressing mechanism. Therefore, our blockchain-based RBAC system has 
a built-in confidentiality and authorization feature since the issuer private key is 
used to sign each policy ownership transaction such as policy creation, update 
and revocation. 
− 
 
 
 
6 Performance Evaluation 
Every transaction sent to execute the code of a smart contract in the EOS 
blockchain system requires the consumption of resources [64]. The EOS blockchain 
classifies resources into three types: computing power, storage and network band- 
width. For the sake of simplicity, we simply indicate them as CPU, RAM and 
NET, respectively. A transaction sent to execute the code of a smart contract 
can only be successful if the sender possesses enough resources. Otherwise, EOS 
asks the owner to acquire resources by spending EOS tokens. An EOS token is 
a utility token, and owning the tokens (staking) provide bandwidth and storage 
on the EOS blockchain. It is worth noticing that registered users freely obtain 
tokens from the EOS blockchain network [12]. Moreover, EOS provides an essen- 
tial characteristic to delegate resources. Token holders delegate computation and 
bandwidth to other users in the network. This essentially means that if token 
holders are not utilizing their allocated CPU and NET, then they can rent or 
delegate these additional resources to other users in the EOS system. However, 
unlike bandwidth and computation, token holders cannot delegate RAM [16]. 
Unlike the Ethereum platform, EOS smart contracts and DAPPs work without 
transaction fee. Users with certain number of tokens obtain a percentage of the 
EOS computational power. Moreover, the EOS platform provides free usage to 
the registered users. However, users only need EOS tokens to send transactions 
to perform operations on the blockchain [65] [34]. Finally, EOS allocates the 
contract owners the resources of Block Producers (BPs) when they spend their 
tokens to acquire RAM. Indeed, this technique aims to efficiently manage the 
resources of Block Producers. More importantly, EOS distributes resources pro- 
portionally to the number of EOS tokens staked by a user. For instance, if an 
EOS user stakes 1% of the total EOS tokens, then that user can utilize 1% of the 
system resources as well. Moreover, EOS releases the allocated CPU and NET 
when the user unstake tokens [16]. 
 
6.1 Experiment Setting 
We use the C++ programming language to write the code of our RBAC smart 
contract, deploy and test it on the EOS Kylin Testnet. Users interested to write 
smart contracts for the EOS blockchain need to install the Contract Develop- 
ment Toolkit (CDT). The CDT tool contains the eosio cpp command that 
compiles the contract’s C++ file to Web Assembly (WASM) format. This is 
how it generates the related Application Binary Interface (ABI) files to enable 
user action to convert between JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and their 
binary form [16]. Unlike the Ethereum platform which customizes a virtual ma- 
chine for executing code, EOS chooses WASM so that developers can write smart 
contracts in different programming languages (e.g., EOS currently supports the 
C++ programming language). Moreover, EOS provides local testnets as well as 
mainnets4  to compile and deploy smart contracts. We installed Ubuntu 18.04 
 
4 Kylin and Jungle testnets are currently available for testing EOS DAPPs and smart 
contracts 
  
 
on a laptop computer containing core i7 CPU, 16 GB RAM, 500 GB SSD and 
installed the EOSIO version 1.8.1. We use the methods described in [16] to built 
a local testnet for the purpose of testing and evaluation. To further evaluate  the 
performance of our proposed RBAC contract, we deploy our RBAC smart 
contract on the EOS Kylin5 testnet. 
 
6.2 Results 
Table 2 shows the one-time constant resource consumption costs of the different 
functions of our proposed RBAC smart contract. Our experimental results reveal 
that the Permission Assignment Transaction (PAT) requires higher resource 
consumption cost than the remaining functions of the smart contract. This is     due 
to the fact that PAT requires multiple elements (e.g., role, resource, action, 
constraint) as input parameters that needs more CPU and Net usage compared     to 
the costs of the other functions. The service providers or third-parties use      the 
Check Access function of our RBAC smart contract to determine access permission 
in the RBAC policy database. This function first checks the subject- role 
relationship in the blockchain to verify the role membership of the requesting 
subject. It then checks the associated role-permission relationship to determine 
access permission in the blockchain. 
 
 
Table 2: CPU and Net costs of the RBAC contract 
RBAC Transaction CPU Usage(µs) Net Usage(Bytes) 
Role Assignment 606 168 
Role Update 347 168 
Role Revocation 209 104 
Check Access 305 104 
Right Transfer 511 176 
Remove Right Transfer 254 104 
Permission Assignment 856 160 
Permission Update 570 160 
Permission Revocation 230 104 
 
 
 
Network Latency Figure 5 shows the network latency experienced and com- 
pares it with the latency of the RBAC system on the Ethereum blockchain 
network. We setup our own EOS private testnet to measure the latency of our 
proposed RBAC system. An EOS local private testnet can be configured with 
different number of miners who process all the transactions to the smart contract 
and shows the latency (in milliseconds). Our experimental results clearly show 
that RBAC on the EOS blockchain requires on average 46.23 ms latency. How- 
ever, the RBAC system on the Ethereum blockchain requires approximately 225 
5 https://www.cryptokylin.io/ 
Σ 
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ms average network latency [66]. It is worth noticing that the service providers 
may exploit a local cache to fetch the policy database from the smart contract for 
authorization validation. In this case, the network latency will further decrease. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Network Latency Comparison between Ethereum and EOS 
 
 
Block Generation Time (BGT) Block generation time defines the average 
amount of time to mine the next block in the blockchain network. A powerful 
feature of the EOS blockchain is that it creates blocks every 0.5 seconds. A Block 
Producer (similar to a miner) node needs some waiting time when it completes 
a given transaction before 0.5 seconds. It then broadcasts the processing block 
to other block producers in the network. Consequently, users experience a faster 
chain experience resembling a web app or a payment card. We can use the follow- 
ing equation to calculate the time from when the transaction is first processed to 
when the block containing that transaction is confirmed in the blockchain 
network [67]. 
 
 
BttTu = Tx
(tTxConfirmed − MAXblock (tTxEXEDONE ))
(s/tx) (5)
 
Count(Tx in (ti, tj)) 
where tT xConfirmed indicates the time when the transaction is first confirmed 
and MAXblock(tT xEXEDONE) indicates the timestamp when the execution of the 
final transaction in the same block containing Tx finishes. We can also use the 
following equation to find the average block generation time (BGT) to know the 
whole system. 
BttT = u
(BttTu)
(s/tx) (6) 
N 
 
 
 
The role-based access control policies can be valid only if miners have con- 
firmed the policy-related transactions to the RBAC smart contract and these 
transactions are added to new blocks in the network. Both Bitcoin and Ethereum 
assemble all broadcasted transactions into blocks. The Proof-of-Work (PoW) 
mining algorithm is used where every node computes a puzzle. For Ethereum, 
the block generation time is directly proportional to the transaction rate. The 
Ethereum implementation has significantly reduced the block generation time 
from 10 min to 15 seconds. However, the delegated proof-of-stake (DPOS) mech- 
anism is more robust since witnesses are voted by the stakeholders, leading to 
lower block generation time and shorter time to confirm transactions. Figure 6 
shows a comparison of the block generation time between the two popular smart 
contract platforms. For Ethereum private testnet, we initially conducted an ex- 
periment by configuring one miner to mine blocks. The block generation time 
decreases and becomes stable when the miner count reaches 4 [41]. However, the 
EOS blockchain produces new blocks every 500 milliseconds irrespective of the 
number of miner. The given results clearly reveal that the EOS blockchain is the 
future of decentralized applications to achieve a wide range of applications 
including efficient access control solutions for a wide range of domains. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: Comparison of Block Generation Time 
 
 
 
Contract Execution Time Contract execution time can be defined as the 
total amount of time (in seconds) that the blockchain platform takes to execute 
and confirm all transactions to the smart contract. In blockchain systems, the 
execution time depends on the program logic implemented by the smart con- 
tracts. We can use the following equation to determine how transactions are 
executed for a peer u in the blockchain network [67]. For the sake of simplicity, 
we abbreviate transaction as Tx, as shown below: 
Σ 
Σ 
 
 
 
 
CETu = 
Tx(tTxEXEDONE − tTxEXESTART )(s/tx) (7) 
Count(Tx in (ti, tj)) 
 
where tT xEXEST ART indicates the time when the transaction execution starts 
and tT xEXEDONE indicates the time when the execution finishes. We can use the 
following equation to take the average: 
 
CET = u
(ETu)
(s/tx) (8) 
N 
Figure 7 shows the average execution time for the two popular smart contract 
platforms for different transaction volumes. The average is taken by repeating 
the experiment 20 times for each transaction volume. The results reveal the dif- 
ference between the performance of EOS and Ethereum blockchains when the 
number of transactions grows from 5000 to 10000. It is worth noticing that a 
large number of transactions are broadcasted to the public blockchain network. 
Therefore, we also investigate the performance of both platforms under high 
transaction volume. The given results reveal that the execution time for both 
blockchain platforms increases as we increase the number of broadcasted trans- 
actions. In particular, the execution time of the EOS blockchain is 42 times less 
than that of Ethereum at low transaction rate. However, the difference between 
the execution time decreases as the transaction rate further increases. Conse- 
quently, EOS outperforms Ethereum under both low and high transaction rates, 
thereby making it a suitable platform to design access control solutions for a 
wide range of domains. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Execution time comparison between Ethereum and EOS 
Σ 
 
 
 
Transactions Per Second Unlike the Ethereum platform, the EOS blockchain 
shows better performance for deploying and executing the code of smart con- 
tracts. Throughput can be simply defined as the number of transactions per 
second, which is measured in a period of time [67]. The following equation shows 
how to compute the throughput of a peer u during a time interval ranging from 
ti to tj. 
 
 
Throughputu = 
Count(Tx in (ti, tj))
(txs/s) (9)
 
tj − ti 
When considering the throughput of N peers, we can use the following equa- 
tion to take the average: 
Throughput = u
(Throughputu)
(txs/s) (10) 
N 
Figure 8 shows throughput comparison among the popular blockchain plat- 
forms. Earlier PoW-based blockchain platforms such as Ethereum and Bitcoin 
require a large amount of computing power for hash calculation, which results in 
a very low throughput. Thanks to the advancement in consensus algorithms [14], 
the EOS blockchain offers improved throughput and processing abilities. The 
EOS blockchain platform uses an efficient DPOS consensus algorithm, which 
remove meaningless computing power loss and lead to higher throughput. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Throughput Comparison among the popular blockchain platforms 
 
 
 
Resource Consumption This experiment aims to evaluate the effects of the 
number of matches in the RBAC policy on resource consumption in the EOS 
blockchain network. A match in the RBAC policy database essentially consists of 
validating the granted role in the subject-role relationship database and checking the 
associated role-permission relationship in the blockchain to see whether the 
  
 
requesting subject can perform the requested operation on a certain resource. 
Consequently, our RBAC smart contract returns true when a match is found, 
otherwise, it returns false. In other words, we wanted to test the output of the 
Check Access function to see how does it behave when we simultaneously call 
it with different subject IDs. To accomplish this goal, we randomly change the 
IDs of the subjects when determining the access permissions in the blockchain. 
Figure 9 shows the average resource consumption in the EOS blockchain network 
when the Check Access function executes with different subject IDs. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: Number of matches vs. Resource Consumption 
 
 
 
7 Conclusion and Future Work 
 
This research work proposes a scalable role-based access control system for both 
intra-organizational and inter-organizational access control. The administrative 
user (issuer) in an organization assign permissions to roles and grants suitable 
roles to subjects according to the organization’s requirements. Both subject-role 
relationship and role-permission relationships are transparently stored in the 
blockchain. When a subject sends access request to the service provider(s) to 
perform an operation on a certain resource, the service provider(s) references 
these relationships in the blockchain to check the status of access permission. 
Therefore, our decentralized blockchain-based RBAC efficiently solves the ac- 
cess control problem in both scenarios. Moreover, we propose a scalable RBAC 
framework to allow resource owners to control access to their sensitive con- 
tents. Each resource owner sends transaction to the RBAC smart contract to 
create role-permission relationships. The resource owner can also delete these 
  
 
relationships at any given time. Currently, the General Data Protection Regu- lation 
(GDPR) protects personal information and it requires resource owners to acquire a 
user consent to store and manage his/her personal information. The GDPR also 
ensures ”the right to erasure” i.e. the user has the right to delete personal 
information at any given time. In any blockchain based solution this  right can be 
satisfied by encrypting personal information and by destroying the decryption key 
to prevent further accesses to an erased information. 
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